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1. See
http://ec.europa.eu/europe
2020/index_en.htm.
2. ‘In markets where innova-
tion is an important competi-
tive force, a merger may
increase the firms’ ability and
incentive to bring new inno-
vations to the market and,
thereby, the competitive
pressure on rivals to innovate
in that market. Alternatively,
effective competition may be
significantly impeded by a
merger between two impor-
tant innovators’ (ECMG para-
graph 38).
3. ‘In order to determine the
impact of a concentration
on competition in the
common market, it is appro-
priate to take account of
any substantiated and
likely efficiencies put for-
ward by the undertakings
concerned. It is possible
that the efficiencies
brought about by the con-
centration counteract the
effects on competition, and
in particular the potential
harm to consumers, that it
might otherwise have and
that, as a consequence, the
concentration would not
significantly impede effec-
tive competition’ (ECMG
paragraph 29).
4. ECMG (paragraph 78).
5. For a more detailed
definition and
classification, see Neven
and Seabright (2003). 
6. This may apply to other
areas within the competi-
tion policy portfolio, but our
emphasis here is  exclu-
sively on merger control.
7. For instance, see the
ECMR (paragraph 29) and
the ECMG (paragraph 87).
1 INNOVATION EFFECTS IN EU MERGER CONTROL:
THE PRINCIPLES
Innovation is becoming more central for
competitiveness, both for countries and
companies. In many markets, the ability of
companies to compete is fundamentally driven by
their ability to innovate successfully, while
policymakers are increasingly focused on
innovation as a basis for growth. The European
Union's Europe 2020 strategy, for example, has
innovation  at its heart1.
Mergers and acquisitions can have a significant
impact on the development of the structure of an
industry, and on its capability to innovate. The
European Commission and its directorate-general
for competition (DG COMP), acknowledges this in
theory, at least since the publication of its 2004
guidelines on the assessment of horizontal
mergers2 (ECMG). These highlight the
appropriateness of taking efficiencies into
account in order to better determine the effects of
a merger on competition, and point to the
possibility of efficiencies to counteract the harm
that a merger could otherwise cause3. In order to
accept and take efficiencies into account, the
European Commission specifically requires
efficiencies to (a) benefit consumers, (b) be
merger-specific, and (c) be verifiable4.
In merger cases, efficiencies are typically
classified into two groups: static efficiencies,
which relate to variable and marginal costs
reductions; and dynamic efficiencies, which can
involve fixed cost savings or higher investments.
Although innovation could relate to reductions of
variable and marginal costs, it is typically
considered to fall into the dynamic efficiencies
category5.
In this Policy Contribution, we look beyond the
principles to observe how DG COMP has concretely
taken into account innovation effects in merger
control6. The evidence suggests that, despite the
European Commission highlighting innovation as
the key to growth, DG COMP is not ‘walking the
talk’. Few cases have been claimed and examined
for their innovation effects. And when examined,
innovation effects have not turned out to be
decisive for competition assessments, with
verifiability being a major constraint for DG COMP,
preventing it from fully incorporating innovation
effects in its analyses. In order to improve on the
treatment of innovation effects in merger cases,
we show how an ex-ante framework for predicting
innovation effects can be designed, based on
insights from the economics and management
literature.
2 INNOVATION EFFECTS IN MERGER CONTROL:
THE PRACTICE
The ‘new’ (or ‘revised’) Merger Regulation (ECMR:
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004), finalised in 2004,
created the first formal EU framework for an ‘effi-
ciency defence’, allowing for the possibility that
the merger would involve significant efficiency
gains that could counteract the adverse impact on
competition. The ECMR does not exclude the pos-
sibility that the Commission can itself take effi-
ciency effects into account as part of its
substantive analysis of the consequences of the
merger, even if the parties have not submitted
them. However, an analysis of the implementation
of the ECMR shows that the Commission has
made little use of this option. Case law shows that
the burden of proof when it comes to efficiency
effects rests with the parties to the merger7. DG
COMP only attempts to assess efficiency effects
in a systematic manner when they are alleged by
the notifying parties in those merger cases that
pass through Phase II investigation,  ie those noti-
fied cases where the Commission has raised seri-
ous doubts in Phase I, leading to a definite
possibility of a negative decision.
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In order to assess how DG COMP has tackled these
claimed efficiencies in practice, we looked at all
Phase II cases under the new ECMR (2004-11)8.
As only a small proportion of cases go into Phase
II (about five percent), the analysis can only rely
on 42 cases9. Table 1 shows the results. There
were no negative decisions.
Of the 42 Phase II cases, efficiency claims were
put forward in 11 cases. In nine cases, both static
and dynamic efficiencies were claimed; in two
cases, only dynamic efficiencies were claimed.
This means that in only 26 percent of the cases
did parties to the merger claim efficiencies. Inter-
estingly, out of the 42 cases, there were at least
two in which the Commission suggested that it
would very likely have accepted efficiency claims,
but it did not verify them because the parties did
not claim and substantiate them. This shows (a)
the aforementioned placing of the burden of proof
on the notifying parties, and (b) the trade-off that
DG COMP constantly faces between its willingness
(and ability) to identify and introduce efficiency
considerations in its analysis, and the fear of
taking on the burden of proof and causing a sig-
nificant loss of legal certainty.
Of the 11 claimed cases, efficiency claims were
accepted in only two. Both static and dynamic
efficiency claims have a low acceptance rate, but
dynamic efficiencies in particular have a very low
probability of acceptance. There seem to be no
major differences in how decisive the various
conditions for acceptance were (verifiability,
merger-specificity, and consumer benefit).
Even in the unlikely event of claimed efficiencies
being accepted, the claimed and accepted
efficiencies, whether static or dynamic, have
never proved to be decisive in case decisions, ie
have never changed a case decision.
It is worth noting that the two cases that were
accepted are both related to non-horizontal activ-
ities. The European Commission specifically high-
lights that, unlike horizontal integration, vertical
8. For a similar analysis of
static and dynamic
efficiency claims for cases
from 2004-09, see Röller
(2010).
9. As of June 1, 2011, out of
a total of 58 cases
(including 21 Art. 8(1), 23
Art. 8(2), 2 Art. 8(3), and
12 aborted or withdrawn
cases), 43 decisions had
been published. In one
case, the European
Commission indicated that
the parties had put forward
an efficiency defence, but
did not provide any details.
Although we know that
efficiencies were alleged
and not decisive, we do not
know about the other
variables, thus the case has
not been included in the
analysis.
10. In its non-horizontal
merger guidelines (2008/C
265/07, paragraphs 11 and
13), the Commission states
that ‘non-horizontal merg-
ers are generally less likely
than horizontal mergers to
significantly impede effec-
tive competition’, and ‘verti-
cal and conglomerate
mergers provide substantial
scope for efficiencies. A
characteristic of vertical
mergers and certain con-
glomerate mergers is that
the activities and/or the
products of the companies
involved are complemen-
tary to each other. The inte-
gration of complementary
activities or products within
a single firm may produce
significant efficiencies and
be pro-competitive’. 
11. For instance, see ECMG,
paragraph 81.
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‘Most worrying is that innovation efficiency claims have not been decisive in any cases. DG
COMP has not considered them important enough to influence its decision. DG COMP, in its case
decisions, has clearly stated that that the same conclusion would have been reached anyway.’
and conglomerate mergers provide substantial
scope for efficiencies10. This suggests that the
Commission is more likely to accept efficiencies
brought about by non-horizontal mergers.
Although it is more difficult in horizontal mergers
to have efficiency claims accepted, it is not per se
excluded. All three conditions have each been met
at least once since 2004.
The most worrying finding is undoubtedly that
efficiency claims have been decisive in none of
the Phase II cases. This means that DG COMP has
not considered them important enough to
influence its decision. DG COMP, in its case
decisions, has clearly stated that the same
conclusion would have been reached anyway.
In addition, DG COMP’s assessment of efficiencies
lacks clarity. Whether or not a hypothetical
efficiency meets a particular condition (namely
verifiability, merger specificity, and consumer
benefit) is often defined only vaguely. One has to
read between the lines to assess DG COMP’s
position. Also DG COMP’s final conclusions on the
examined efficiencies are not clearly stated and
are somehow left open.
As our attention is particularly focused on inno-
vation effects, we analysed the 42 Phase II cases
in more detail in this regard. The European Com-
mission specifically recognises the possibility for
mergers to lead to innovation-related efficien-
cies11. Table 2 on the next page reports the results:
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Table 1: Efficiency claims in EU Phase II merger
decisions (2004-11)
Out of 42 cases Static efficiency
claims
Dynamic
efficiency claims
Alleged 9 11
Verifiable 3 3
Merger specific 3 4
Consumer benefit 3 4
Accepted 2 1
Decisive 0 0
Source: On the basis of http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
mergers/cases/ (DG COMP).
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only four out of the 42 cases  claimed innovation
effects. Only one innovation claim was accepted,
but did not influence the decision. With so few
data points, one cannot draw any firm conclu-
sions. Nevertheless, some interesting observa-
tions can be made. The verifiability condition
seems to be the most difficult to meet. This is con-
sistent with case law and the horizontal merger
guidelines, all suggesting that efficiencies are
much more likely to be considered when their
effect on consumer welfare (via their direct effect
on prices) is more immediate and verifiable. This
is unfortunate for innovation impact assessments
of mergers because innovation effects are typi-
cally uncertain and become clear only over the
medium to long-term.
That the Commission accepted the existence of
innovation-related efficiencies in one case
indicates that DG COMP has not strictly ruled out
innovation-related efficiencies. Nevertheless, the
case evidence from the implementation of the
ECMG shows that innovation-related efficiencies
do not receive the treatment that they should or
could be receiving.
3 PROBLEMS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF INNOVATION
EFFECTS IN MERGER CONTROL
There are two related problems with the current
implementation of efficiency effects in the ECMG.
The first is the low rate of cases claiming
innovation-related efficiencies, which is in casu a
necessary condition for innovation-related
efficiencies to be examined by DG COMP.
One reason for the low rate of cases claiming inno-
vation-related efficiencies could be that the Phase
Table 2: Innovation-related efficiency claims in
EU Phase II merger decisions (2004 to present)
Out of 42 cases Innovation-related efficiency
claims
Alleged 4
Verifiable 1
Merger specific 2
Consumer benefit 3
Accepted 1
Decisive 0
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/
(DG COMP).
BOX 1: THE ROLE OF INNOVATION EFFECTS IN EU
MERGER CASES
Cases with innovation-related efficiencies
alleged and accepted:
• Metso/Aker Kvaerner (Paper): dynamic effi-
ciencies (development of better and more
environmentally-friendly products) were,
although not clearly stated, deemed verifi-
able and merger specific, to the benefit of
consumers, but were not case-decisive.
Cases with innovation-related efficiencies
alleged, but not accepted:
• Nokia/NAVTEQ (telecoms): vertical acquisi-
tion of a navigable digital-map database
provider by a mobile telephone producer.
Static efficiencies were accepted (elimina-
tion of double mark-ups), but dynamic effi-
ciencies (faster and better development of
map functionalities) were deemed not verifi-
able or merger specific.
• TomTom/Tele Atlas (software): vertical acqui-
sition of a navigable digital-map provider by a
portable navigation devices producer. The
claimed static efficiencies were accepted
(elimination of double mark-ups), but the
dynamic efficiencies (the development of
better and faster maps) were not as they
were deemed not verifiable.
• T-Mobile Austria/Telering (telecoms): mobile
phone operators. Dynamic efficiencies
(better capacity utilisation) claimed, con-
sumer benefit not accepted.
Some cases involving innovation-intensive
sectors or innovation-active firms not claiming
efficiencies:
Oracle/Sun Microsystems (computer
programming); IBM/Telelogic (ICT services);
Google/DoubleClick (internet);
Thomson/Reuters (ICT services);
Thales/Finmeccanica/AlcatelAlena/Telespazio
(aerospace); JCI/VB/FIAMM (electric
components); Johnson&Johnson/Gundant
(medical instruments); Siemens/VATech
(electric equipment); Blackstone/Acetex
(chemicals).
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12. The classification of
industries as medium and
high-tech is based on the
OECD classification. The
classification of firms into
innovation-active or not is
done on the basis of their
presence in the EC-IPTS
Scoreboard of top R&D
spenders (see:
http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/re
search/scoreboard.htm).
The sector definition used
here may be too broad to
reflect the market associ-
ated with the specific
merger case. Similarly,
firms may be among the top
R&D spenders, but not nec-
essarily active in R&D for
the specific market
involved in the case. On the
other hand, firms may be
innovation-active, but not
big enough to qualify for the
scoreboard.
13. Out of the total of 28
innovation-sensitive cases,
20 involved firms that are in
the scoreboard of largest
R&D spenders (see foot-
note 12). Twelve cases
score positive on both crite-
ria (including three out of
the four claiming cases). All
12 aborted/withdrawn
cases can be classified as
innovation-sensitive. Seven
of these cases involved
firms that are in the largest
R&D spenders scoreboard.
Three of these cases scored
positive on both criteria.
14. ‘Failure to provide infor-
mation on efficiencies will
not be taken to imply that
the proposed concentration
does not create efficiencies
or that the rationale for the
concentration is to increase
market power. Not providing
the requested information
on efficiencies at the notifi-
cation stage does not pre-
clude providing the
information at a later stage’
(Commission Regulation
(EC) No.802/2004). Note
that innovation could still
be of relevance in any of
the other 21 cases that
II mergers simply did not offer any innovation effi-
ciencies, and therefore the parties did not raise
the issue. That, however, seems highly unlikely.
When we look at the sectors and the companies
involved, there are several Phase II cases in which
innovation effects can be presumed to be present.
A case can be defined as innovation-sensitive,
when either (i) it is in a medium or high-tech
sector (ie a sector with an above-average research
and development intensity), and/or (ii) the par-
ties to the merger are significant innovators12.
Using these criteria, we find that 28 out of the 42
Phase II cases can be classified as innovation
intensive, including the four cases that claimed
innovation effects (see Box 1 for examples)13.
Perhaps the merging parties in the innovation-
sensitive cases did not claim any innovation-
related efficiencies because the innovation
effects were more likely to affect the innovative
incentives and capabilities in the industry nega-
tively rather than positively. If that were the case,
the fact that DG COMP is not assessing innovation
effects if they are not claimed by the merging par-
ties is problematic, because it would preclude an
assessment of negative innovation effects, poten-
tially harming consumers.
Another likely motivation for merging parties not
to claim innovation-related (or any) efficiencies,
even if they exist, is, as Röller (2010) suggests,
one of ‘informational efficiency offence’. The cur-
rent legal framework establishes that not claim-
ing efficiencies will not lead to any negative
presumption14. Claiming them might be consid-
ered a sign of a ‘weak’ case: if they are empha-
sised, it is because there is a negative effect to
counteract. Thus, there is an incentive for the par-
ties to a merger not to claim innovation-related
efficiencies, which in reality means that the
effects of the merger on innovation will not be duly
assessed, as DG COMP currently does not assess
effects that are not claimed.
The second problem is the low probability of
acceptance and the lack of influence of
innovation-related effects. Innovation – either
incremental or disruptive – has obvious effects15,
either by introducing new or better products and
varieties, and/or through reduced production
costs. The Commission is well aware that
innovation effects can be very important for
consumers, which is shown by Table 2: the
‘consumer benefit’ condition was accepted in
three out of the four innovation-claiming cases.
Nevertheless, the consumer-surplus effects from
merger-induced innovation effects are difficult to
verify immediately, as the success of innovative
efforts is highly uncertain and usually only
becomes apparent in the medium or long term. DG
COMP is less inclined to accept efficiencies that
are not evident in the short term16. Because of
their higher uncertainty, efficiencies that come
into effect in the longer term will be more likely to
fail the ‘verifiability’ condition (see Table 2).
Obviously, innovation effects, with their inherent
uncertain and longer-term characteristics, are
more difficult to predict and assess, but this
should not be translated into a reluctance to do so,
as this would almost by definition rule out the
inclusion of innovation effects. As we will show,
economists have developed and continue to
develop a body of know-how that can provide a
good framework for assessing ex ante the factors
that determine the size and direction of post-
merger innovation effects.
4 CAN POST-MERGER INNOVATION EFFECTS BE
ASSESSED EX ANTE? INSIGHTS FROM THE
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
Academic literature has looked at the link between
mergers  and R&D investment, and at innovation
outcomes following mergers. Although clearly
more work needs to be done, there are already
robust insights that can be drawn out to help com-
petition policy authorities when assessing the
likely impact of a merger on innovation. We will
briefly review the most relevant insights from both
theoretical and empirical literature. We concen-
trate on the direct effect of mergers on innovation.
‘Merging parties in innovation-sensitive cases did not claim efficiencies perhaps because the
innovation effects were likely to be negative. The fact that DG COMP is not assessing innovation effects
if they are not claimed could preclude assessment of negative effects, potentially harming consumers.’
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were not considered highly
innovation-intensive. For
instance, one of the four
cases in which innovation-
related efficiencies were
alleged is not within the set
of innovation-intensive
cases.
15. It is not the aim of this
Policy Contribution to take
part in the debate about
which welfare standard –
consumer surplus vs. total
welfare – is the most
appropriate.
16. ‘In general, the longer
the start of the efficiencies
is projected into the future,
the less probability the
Commission may be able to
assign to the efficiencies
actually being brought
about’ (ECMG, paragraph
86).
17. For example Caves
(1989), Cohen and Levin
(1989), Röller et al (2001),
Kamien and Schwartz
(1982), De Bondt (1997).
18. For example Hall
(1999), Hitt et al (1991),
Ravenscraft and Scherer
(1987), Valentini (2011).
19. See Cassiman et al
(2005) for a review of the
analyses of the impact of
technology and market-
relatedness together with
other characteristics. Other
factors beyond  the technol-
ogy-relatedness of the
merging parties include the
debt-financing character of
the deal and the quality of
the pre- and post-acquisi-
tion integration strategy.
The indirect effects on innovation which run
through the product market effect are typically
taken into account elsewhere in the case analysis.
Theoretical studies on industrial organisation
provide arguments for both positive and negative
effects on the technological activities of the
merging firms after a merger17:
• When the merger allows for the elimination of
duplicated R&D, R&D inputs will decrease after
the merger, but R&D efficiency will increase.
• A merger might realise scale and/or scope
economies and/or synergies in R&D by
combining the R&D capabilities of both
merging parties, in which case merged firms
have a bigger incentive to perform R&D than
before their merger. This can, however, be
counteracted by increased organisational
complexity.
• A merger might reduce R&D competition. The
possibility to better coordinate R&D invest-
ment after the merger will typically lead to lower
R&D expenditures, unless technology
spillovers are important, in which case a merger
will lead to higher R&D expenditures.
In the absence of unidirectional effects predicted
from theory, it is no surprise that earlier empirical
studies generated mixed findings: sometimes
positive, sometimes insignificant, but often
negative effects on the post-acquisition R&D input
and output of acquiring firms18.
More recent work has looked at factors that help
to produce more clearcut predictions. Of particu-
lar use for better determining the impact of merg-
ers on R&D is the extent to which the technologies
and product markets in which the merging parties
were active are related19. The impact of a merger
between firms that operate in the same techno-
logical field is expected to lead to a rationalisation
of the R&D process, while merging firms active in
complementary technological fields are more
likely to realise synergies in the R&D process
through their merger. Similarly a common tech-
nology base facilitates the integration of the merg-
ing parties’ knowledge bases.
Table 3 summarises the different potential effects
of mergers on R&D. A quick glance at the table
immediately shows why previous literature has
found mixed results: the total effect of a merger on
Table 3: Predicted effects of mergers on the R&D process by technology relatedness
Impact (positive/negative/unknown) Likelihood that predicted effect may occur when...
Effects of merger R&D input R&D efficiency Firms are active in
same product
markets
Firms are active in
same technological
fields
Firms are active in
complementary
technological fields
Indivisibilities/specialisa-
tion: spreading fixed cost
of R&D over more R&D
output (scale)
+ + Medium High Low
Indivisibilities/specialisa-
tion: spreading fixed cost
of R&D over more and dif-
ferent types of R&D
output (scope)
+ + Medium Low High
Elimination of common
R&D inputs – + High High Low
Synergies: combining
different R&D knowledge
inputs
+ + Low Low High
Technology market power
and appropriation ? + Medium High Low
Internal organisational
changes – – High Medium Low
R&D input/R&D performance
TOTAL EFFECT ? ? –     /     +? ?       /      + +       /      +
Source: Adapted from Cassiman et al (2005).
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R&D inputs and R&D efficiency can increase or
decrease depending on which effect dominates
the merger. After classifying the merger according
to the technological and product-market related-
ness of merging parties, the effect on the R&D
process becomes more clear-cut. For companies
with complementary technologies, mergers are
predicted to lead to more R&D inputs and greater
R&D efficiency. Companies with similar technolo-
gies are more likely than companies with comple-
mentary technologies to cut R&D inputs. In any
case, a positive effect on R&D efficiency is more
likely. Mergers between companies in the same
product market, however, are more likely to have a
negative effect on R&D inputs and R&D efficiency,
compared to companies that do not operate in the
same product market.
Where empirical studies identified the technology-
relatedness between target and acquirer, it was
possible to come up with more clear-cut empirical
evidence on the impact of mergers on R&D. As an
illustration, Box 2 discusses the empirical results
from Cassiman et al (2005) in some detail.
Although the number of cases in this study is
small and not random, and only a subset of rele-
vant moderating factors could be analysed, the
study is interesting because it illustrates an effec-
tive methodology to better assess the innovation
effects of mergers. It uses a combination of
BOX 2:  CASSIMAN et al (2005) STUDY ON THE
IMPACT OF MERGERS ON INNOVATION.
Using information on 31 in-depth cases of
horizontal M&A deals in medium and high-tech
industries, Cassiman et al (2005) shows that
technology-relatedness between M&A partners
distinctly affects the impact on innovation. The
study simultaneously also corrects for product
market-relatedness between merging parties. The
case studies were based on a structured
questionnaire that collected qualitative data in a
standardised format suitable for statistical
analysis. Respondents were asked to assess the
market- and technology-relatedness of the partners
involved. This survey information was cross-
checked with available public information on
detailed production and patent classification
information. In order to assess technology
relatedness and innovation effects, a combination
of survey and public information was used.
The results can be summarised as follows:
When merged entities are technologically comple-
mentary, they become more active R&D perform-
ers after the M&A. R&D efficiency increases more
when merged entities are technologically comple-
mentary than when they are substitutive. Comple-
mentary technology firms redeploy resources
across the new entity to create critical mass in
technological fields that are new to the firm, and to
develop new competences.
In sharp contrast, when merged entities are tech-
nologically substitutive, they significantly decrease
their R&D level after the M&A. As predicted, such
firms rely on the rationalisation of R&D activity to a
much greater extent than firms with complemen-
tary technology specialisation. In addition, organi-
sational problems engendered by the deal,
especially those associated with the motivation of
R&D personnel, were found to be more serious for
firms with the same – rather than complementary
– technological capabilities. The reduction of R&D is
more evident if merged entities were rivals in the
product market prior to their merger.
In addition, mergers between firms with
overlapping technological knowledge are more
often associated with a reduction of competition in
technology markets, than those between firms with
complementary strengths.
These results indicate that mergers between firms
in the same technological fields have a negative
impact on R&D inputs and performance compared
to parties in complementary technological fields.
Similarly, mergers between non-rivals (ie
companies not in the same product market) have a
more positive impact on R&D performance than
mergers of rivals.
Other influencing factors are the extent of debt-
financing of the merger, if the merger had an explicit
innovation motive, if it was cross-border, and if
partners collaborated prior to the merger.
Source: Cassiman, B., Colombo, M., Garrone, P. and R.
Veugelers (2005) ‘The impact of M&A on the R&D process:
an empirical analysis of the role of technological and market
relatedness’, Research Policy 34, 2, 195-220
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20. These cases – Type I
errors – are mergers that
are prevented because they
would imply an increase in
the price level, but the
assessment does not take
into account that the
merger would also entail a
bigger innovation-effi-
ciency impact (which is not
considered).
21. These cases – Type II
errors – are mergers that
are cleared because they
have no effect on prices,
though they would reduce
innovation in the
marketplace, which is not
considered.
22 . As has been done by US
competition authorities
(see OECD, 2007).
theoretical frameworks for more clear-cut predic-
tions. It also shows that it is possible to construct
empirical proxies to measure moderating factors,
such as technology-relatedness. It uses a combi-
nation of publicly available information and pri-
vately obtained survey evidence. A series of
follow-up studies have confirmed the importance
of a framework including technology- and market-
relatedness for identifying the innovation effects
of mergers (eg Valentini, 2012; Ornaghi, 2009).
To summarise, the academic literature shows
there is no automatic relationship between merg-
ers and innovation. To assess innovation effects,
one needs a case-by-case analysis. But the aca-
demic literature does help case analysts to
analyse  innovation effects from mergers ex ante
by identifying factors that reduce the ambivalence
of expected effects. Furthermore, these factors
can be empirically verified and assessed ex ante.
An important factor to consider is the technology-
relatedness of the merging parties. Mergers
between companies with compatible or similar
technologies tend to have a negative effect on
innovation because of R&D rationalisation. Hence,
dynamic efficiency gains are less likely for merg-
ers involving companies with similar technologies.
Furthermore, technology competition is more
likely to diminish after mergers between compa-
nies with similar technologies; mergers between
companies that have complementary technolo-
gies are more likely to lead to synergies and thus
have positive implications for innovation. But
these effects are conditional. Tight management
of the post-deal integration process, which ade-
quately deals with organisational and motiva-
tional problems, is needed to turn potential
dynamic effects into real effects. A number of
other influencing factors will also need to be
assessed alongside technology relatedness.
5 ASSESSING INNOVATION EFFECTS FROM
MERGERS: SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EU
COMPETITION POLICY
In order to tackle the problems that obstruct the
effective treatment of innovation effects in merger
cases, the legal framework and implementation
methodologies need to be reconsidered.
Concerning the legal framework, the ‘informational
efficiency offence’ needs to be addressed. This is
when parties prefer not to claim dynamic effi-
ciencies, even if they exist, in order to not create
the impression that they need an efficiency
defence to compensate for anti-competitive
effects. There are several ways in which this prob-
lem could be solved, but we believe that the best
option would be to make reporting of efficiencies
by the merging parties mandatory, thus removing
the signalling value from (not) claiming.
Mandatory reporting would also alleviate another
problem, namely that DG COMP only analyses
dynamic efficiencies when they are claimed. This
problem results in the shortcoming that mergers
with dynamic efficiencies can be wrongly
precluded, not get the appropriate remedies, or be
withdrawn in anticipation of a negative decision:
in other words, good mergers would be
prevented20. But also it can lead to situations in
which mergers with negative dynamic efficiencies
are cleared or do not get the appropriate remedies.
In other words, bad mergers would not be
blocked21. The scope for bad mergers being cleared
could be quite substantial, particularly when
merging parties are product-market rivals and
have similar technologies, as the academic
literature shows. In order to detect these negative
cases, which will result in negative welfare effects,
DG COMP should  exercise its power to investigate
innovation (in)efficiencies independently, rather
than investigating them only when efficiencies
are claimed by the merging parties.
That brings us to the next problem: only the cases
that go into Phase II are analysed for dynamic
efficiencies, ie when there are significant
competition concerns. Actually, one could use the
academic literature to justify the restriction of
dynamic efficiency analysis to Phase II cases22:
as previously discussed, the recent literature
shows that positive effects on innovation from
mergers typically arise when the merging
companies are neither direct competitors in the
product market, nor operate in the same
technological field. Such non-horizontal mergers
only rarely raise significant competition concerns.
Thus, DG COMP presumably anyway clears cases
that involve no negative dynamic efficiency
effects. In addition, requiring innovation effects to
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be examined in all Phase I cases would imply an
unrealistic burden on DG COMP’s case-handling
capacity. Notwithstanding these arguments, one
needs to be aware that ignoring innovation effects
in Phase I cases also entails a cost, particularly
with respect to detecting possible negative effects
on innovation by third parties. This is especially
the case when the merging parties hold strong
positions in the same technologies, even if they
are not rivals in the product market. An analysis
of Phase I cases for innovation-related effects
would be needed to detect these errors.
A final problem to be addressed is the reluctance
of DG COMP to accept innovation effect
considerations because of lack of ‘verifiability’ of
innovation effects. DG COMP’s reluctance to
assess efficiencies that are uncertain and
relatively distant in time, may de facto exclude the
treatment of innovation effects, as they are
inherently uncertain and longer-term. However,
uncertainty does not mean we cannot make
predictions about expected outcomes. In this
Policy Contribution, we have tried to show that it is
possible to develop good theoretical frameworks,
empirically validated, which can be used to predict
the occurrence and likely outcome of innovation
effects. The factors that condition innovation
effects can be empirically assessed by case
handlers. For instance, the technology relatedness
of the merging parties can be assessed by
combining public (ie patent) and private (ie from
questionnaires) information.
In view of the internal nature of some innovation
components that need to be assessed, reporting
by the parties involved may become an important
information source for case analysts. The merging
parties may over- or misreport (as they may do in
general), but this does not preclude DG COMP from
continuing with its assessment. DG COMP has to
evaluate the quality and verifiability of the
information provided, as it does for any
information coming from the merging companies,
and to look for both external (ie third parties’
submissions or publicly available information)
and further internal evidence to contrast and
complement the reports of the parties to the
merger.
This is particularly the case for mergers that are
potentially harmful to innovation, in which the
parties’ and DG COMP’s views of the post-merger
effects will be most misaligned. We believe that
the existence of possible innovation-related
inefficiencies is precisely why the burden of proof
should not be placed on the notifying parties. It
should be for DG COMP to assess and substantiate
the innovation impact of the merger.
The development of an ex-ante framework for
assessing innovation effects from a merger could
be substantiated with ex-post empirical analysis
of the relevant cases. This ex-post assessment of
cases would help to reinforce the framework
initially set by the Commission. Another
complementary tool could be the monitoring of
particular innovation-intensive sectors, which
would help competition authorities to better
understand the details of the innovation
dynamics and mechanisms of specific markets in
which future merging companies might operate.
Given the increasing importance of innovation in
many markets, we strongly believe that a rule of
reason, or weighting of the positive and negative
innovation effects, should in principle be applied
for all proposed mergers, but a fortiori for all Phase
II mergers. DG COMP should develop a framework
to assess innovation effects within merger
control. This is not an easy task, but it is feasible.
The introduction of such a framework would allow
the European Commission to better assess both
the pro and anti-competitive effects of a merger,
and to further develop an integrated effects-based
approach.
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